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This case highlights and clarifies a number of issues:

• Signs and lines must adequately advise the motorist of the restriction, but do not need to be in pristine condition. Substantial compliance with the regulations is sufficient, but signs must not mislead or fail to inform.
• There is no requirement on the civil enforcement officer to record the model of the vehicle.
• The blue badge concession does not apply when waiting restrictions are in force. When no waiting restrictions are in force, the clock must be set to the time of arrival and three hours parking time is permitted.
• There is no right to an observation period or period of grace.
• The 50% discount is offered to the penalty charge notice only – any further discount is at the council’s discretion.
• The authority has a period of six months to serve the Notice to Owner.

This case clarifies that a review is not an opportunity to bolster a case and that the statement of truth is sufficient to demonstrate that an enforcement camera holds the correct certificate, demonstrating that it meets the requirements of Schedule 1 of the Civil Enforcement of Road Traffic Contraventions (Approved Devices, Charging Guidelines and General Provisions)(England) Regulations 2022.  Further evidence underpinning the certificate or the statement, or any kind of evidential chain, is not required to meet the civil standard of proof. Appeal and review proceedings are public hearings.

This case clarifies that it is the owner of the vehicle who is liable for a bus lane contravention, even if not the driver at the time. The registered keeper listed at the Driving and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) (opens in new tab) is the starting point for establishing ownership of a vehicle.

This case clarifies that pay and display includes the virtual display of payment. It is the responsibility of the motorist to enter and select the correct location when using a pay-by-phone or parking mobile application, and an adjudicator cannot consider mitigation.

1. This claim before Swift J concerned a narrow issue as to whether unlawfully parking in a bay on a red route was a contravention for which the PCN could be the subject of notification by post. Swift J found that it could.  The issue turned on the proper definition of red route under the Regulations.  Whilst that substantive point may be of restricted interest, the case provides some helpful guidance on the proper scope of the “interests of justice” ground for reviews by adjudicators.
2. In one of the consolidated cases, TfL sought a review of an adverse decision of an adjudicator under paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Enforcement of Road Traffic Contraventions (Representations and Appeals) (England) Regulations 2022 on the basis that the adjudicator had misconstrued the meaning of red route under the Regulations (as Swift J ultimately found to be the case). On the review, relying on R (Malik) v Manchester Crown Court [2008] EMLR 19 (a case concerning the limits of judicial review in the context of a challenge to a production order made in the Crown Court), the Chief Adjudicator said that the correct approach to paragraph 12(1)(b)(vi) was as follows.

“The test is not whether the reviewing adjudicator agrees with the first instance determination so that they can substitute their own decision.  The test is whether the first instance decision can be impugned because the original adjudicator was not entitled to reach the determination.”

In other words, the correct test was as to whether there had been any public law error.  He refused the application for review because, in his view, there had been no such an error in this case; and, further, the review was in any event not in the interests of justice because TfL had not acted with due expediency in seeking a review.

3. In his judgment, Swift J made some obiter but important observations on paragraph 12(1)(b)(vi). He considered that the Chief Adjudicator’s decision to refuse the review was correct; but that his reasoning and approach to paragraph 12(1)(b)(vi) were wrong.   Relying on authority on similar provisions applicable in the Employment Tribunals such as Trimble v Super Travel Limited [1982] ICR 440 (Browne-Wilkinson J, then President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal), he held that the principle of finality meant that the Chief Adjudicator was wrong to conclude that paragraph 12(1)(b)(vi) allowed an adjudicator to consider the legality of a previous adjudicator’s decision applying the judicial review principles.  In particular: “If the losing party wishes to challenge a decision on the basis it was wrong in law the correct route is by application for judicial review to [the Administrative Court, not an application under paragraph 12 for a review on the interests of justice ground”.  This is so even where there is an error of law on the face of the decision.
4. He held that, consequently, the Chief Adjudicator ought to have refused the application for review under paragraph 12(1)(b)(vi) because that ground does not permit review on the basis that the decision in question was wrong in law, which was the ground advanced by TfL.
5. On this basis, an application for review under paragraph 12(1)(b)(vi) will only succeed on the basis that there has been an error of law if there is some other element present that is offensive to the interests of justice, e.g. the relevant issue was not ventilated at the hearing because the party complaining did not have an opportunity to present his argument on the point of substance involved. An error of law per se is not enough.